This paper is a study about Philadelphia’s comprehensive user engagement sites (CUESs) as the authors address and examine issues related to the upcoming implementation of a CUES while seeking solutions for its disputed questions and plans. Beginning with the federal drug schedules, the authors visit some of the medical and public health issues vis-à-vis safe injection facilities (SIFs). Insite, a successful Canadian SIF, has been thoroughly researched as it represents a paradigm for which a Philadelphia CUES can expand upon. Also, (...) the existing criticisms against SIFs are revisited while critically unpackaged and responded to in favor of the establishment. In the main section, the authors propose the layout and services of the upcoming CUES, much of which would be in congruent to Vancouver’s Insite. On the other hand, the CUES would be distinct from Insite, as the authors emphasize, in that it will offer an information center run by individuals in recovery and place additional emphasis on early education for young healthcare professionals by providing them a platform to work at the site. The paper will also briefly investigate the implementation of a CUES site under an ethical scope of the Harm Reduction Theory. Lastly, the authors recommend some strategic plans that the Philadelphia City government may consider employing at this crucial stage. (shrink)

REMARKS ON EVOLUTION AND TIME-SCALES, Graham Cairns-Smith; HODGSON'S BLACK BOX, Thomas Clark; DO HODGSON'S PROPOSITIONS UNIQUELY CHARACTERIZE FREE WILL?, Ravi Gomatam; WHAT SHOULD WE RETAIN FROM A PLAIN PERSON'S CONCEPT OF FREE WILL?, Gilberto Gomes; ISOLATING DISPARATE CHALLENGES TO HODGSON'S ACCOUNT OF FREE WILL, Liberty Jaswal; FREE AGENCY AND LAWS OF NATURE, Robert Kane; SCIENCE VERSUS REALIZATION OF VALUE, NOT DETERMINISM VERSUS CHOICE, Nicholas Maxwell; COMMENTS ON HODGSON, J.J.C. Smart; THE VIEW FROM WITHIN, Sean Spence; COMMENTARY ON HODGSON, Henry (...) Stapp. (shrink)

It is widely alleged that metaphysical possibility is “absolute” possibility Conceivability and possibility, Clarendon, Oxford, 2002, p 16; Stalnaker, in: Stalnaker Ways a world might be: metaphysical and anti-metaphysical essays, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, pp 201–215; Williamson in Can J Philos 46:453–492, 2016). Kripke calls metaphysical necessity “necessity in the highest degree”. Van Inwagen claims that if P is metaphysically possible, then it is possible “tout court. Possible simpliciter. Possible period…. possib without qualification.” And Stalnaker writes, “we can agree (...) with Frank Jackson, David Chalmers, Saul Kripke, David Lewis, and most others who allow themselves to talk about possible worlds at all, that metaphysical necessity is necessity in the widest sense.” What exactly does the thesis that metaphysical possibility is absolute amount to? Is it true? In this article, I argue that, assuming that the thesis is not merely terminological, and lacking in any metaphysical interest, it is an article of faith. I conclude with the suggestion that metaphysical possibility may lack the metaphysical significance that is widely attributed to it. (shrink)

This paper argues for a treatment of belief as essentially sensitive to certain features of context. The first part gives an argument that we must take belief to be context-sensitive in the same way that assertion is, if we are to preserve appealing principles tying belief to sincere assertion. In particular, whether an agent counts as believing that p in a context depends on the space of alternative possibilities the agent is considering in that context. One and the same doxastic (...) state may amount to belief that p in one context but not another. The second part of the paper gives a formal treatment of doxastic states, according to which belief is context-sensitive along just these lines. The model is applied to characterize (but not to refute) skeptical arguments. (shrink)

It is commonly assumed that the expression “an sich selbst” (“in itself”) in Kant combines with terms to form complex nouns such as “thing in itself” and “end in itself.” I argue that the basic use of “an sich selbst” in Kant’s German is as a sentence adverb, which has the role of modifying subject-predicate combinations, rather than either subject or predicate on their own. Expressions of the form “S is P an sich selbst” mean roughly that S is P (...) ‘in its own right’ or without some further ‘condition’. Accordingly, “an sich selbst” should not be treated as forming complex nouns. This analysis has significant consequences for the interpretation of “thing in itself” in particular, for it implies that the latter is not a complete nominal expression. Instead, one must treat ‘an sich selbst’ as expressing how some S is a ‘thing’, looking to the wider sentential context. I conclude with a brief account of the new significance granted to the concept of a ‘thing’ (Ding) according to the present interpretation. (shrink)

This paper argues, based on Lewis’ claim that communication is a coordination game (Lewis in Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp 3–35, 1975), that we can account for the communicative function of demonstratives without assuming that they semantically refer. The appeal of such a game theoretical version of the case for non-referentialism is that the communicative role of demonstratives can be accounted for without entering the cul de sac of trying to construct conventions (...) of ever-increasing complexity. Instead communication via demonstratives is explained with reference to the general, non-domain specific ability of human beings to solve games of coordination. Furthermore, there is empirical support for such a view. Judgments concerning demonstrative reference have been shown to be sensitive to judgments concerning common ground (Clark et al. in J Verb Learn Verb Behav 22:245–258, 1983), which is exactly what the non-referentialist account would predict. The game theoretical account also allows for an intuitively plausible, non-referentialist treatment of Speaks’ ‘trumping argument’ (Speaks in Philos Stud 174:709–734, 2017), as well as the Carnap/Agnew puzzle (Kaplan in Syntax Semant 9:221–43, 1970). (shrink)

In a recent very interesting and important challenge to tracking theories of knowledge, Williams & Sinhababu claim to have devised a counter-example to tracking theories of knowledge of a sort that escapes the defense of those theories by Adams & Clarke. In this paper we will explain why this is not true. Tracking theories are not undermined by the example of the backward clock, as interesting as the case is.

1. The Situation in Cognition 2. Situated Cognition: A Potted Recent History 3. Extensions in Biology, Computation, and Cognition 4. Articulating the Idea of Cognitive Extension 5. Are Some Resources Intrinsically Non-Cognitive? 6. Is Cognition Extended or Only Embedded? 7. Letting Nature Take Its Course.

ABSTRACT Drawing inspiration from Fred Dretske, L. S. Carrier, John A. Barker, and Robert Nozick, we develop a tracking analysis of knowing according to which a true belief constitutes knowledge if and only if it is based on reasons that are sensitive to the fact that makes it true, that is, reasons that wouldn’t obtain if the belief weren’t true. We show that our sensitivity analysis handles numerous Gettier-type cases and lottery problems, blocks pathways leading to skepticism, and validates the (...) epistemic closure thesis that correct inferences from known premises yield knowledge of the conclusions. We discuss the plausible views of Ted Warfield and Branden Fitelson regarding cases of knowledge acquired via inference from false premises, and we show how our sensitivity analysis can account for such cases. We present arguments designed to discredit putative counterexamples to sensitivity analyses recently proffered by Tristan Haze, John Williams and Neil Sinhababu, which involve true statements made by untrustworthy informants and strange clocks that sometimes display the correct time while running backwards. Finally, we show that in virtue of employing the paradox-free subjunctive conditionals codified by Relevance Logic theorists instead of the paradox-laden subjunctive conditionals codified by Robert Stalnaker and David Lewis. (shrink)

Given any proposition, is it possible to have rationally acceptable attitudes towards it? Absent reasons to the contrary, one would probably think that this should be possible. In this paper I provide a reason to the contrary. There is a proposition such that, if one has any opinions about it at all, one will have a rationally unacceptable set of propositional attitudes—or if one doesn’t, one will end up being cognitively imperfect in some other manner. The proposition I am concerned (...) with is a self-referential propositional attitude ascription involving the propositional attitude of rejection. Given a basic assumption about what constitutes irrationality, and a few assumptions about the nature of cognitively ideal agents, a paradox results. This paradox is superficially like the Liar, but it is importantly different in that no alethic notions are involved at all. As such, it stands independent of the Liar and is not a ‘revenge’ version of it. After setting out the paradox I discuss possible responses. After considering several I argue that one is best off simply accepting that the paradox shows us something surprising and interesting about rationality: that some cognitive shortfall is unavoidable even for ideal agents. I argue that nothing disastrous follows from accepting this conclusion. (shrink)

When some P implies some Q, this should have some impact on what attitudes we take to P and Q. In other words: logical consequence has a normative import. I use this idea, recently explored by a number of scholars, as a stepping stone to a bolder view: that relations of logical consequence can be identified with norms on our propositional attitudes, or at least that our talk of logical consequence can be explained in terms of such norms. I investigate (...) the prospects of such a cognitive norm account of logical consequence. I go over the challenges involved in finding a plausible bridge principle connecting logical consequence to cognitive norms, in particular a biconditional principle that gives us not only necessary but sufficient conditions for logical consequence in terms of norms on propositional attitudes. Then, on the assumption that an adequate norm can be found, I consider what the philosophical merits of such a cognitive norm account would be, and what theoretical commitments it would generate. (shrink)

This paper is basically a presentation of the tenets of Pierre Bourdieu’s philosophy in a language and level that can be easily understood by Filipino students and scholars of philosophy, cultural studies and Philippine studies. The discussion of Bourdieu’s philosophy revolves around 1) his concepts of habitus, field and symbolic violence; 2) his critique of television; 3) his theory of capitals; 4) some implications of his theory of capitals; and 5) his being public intellectual. The ultimate aim of this paper (...) is to suggest some aspects and dimensions of Philippine society and culture that can be analyzed using some of bourdieu’s thoughts as interpretive frameworks, as well as to challenge the said Filipino students and scholars of philosophy, cultural studies and Philippine studies to creatively and effectively appropriate such theories for the enrichment of the theoretical corpus of Philippine studies. This paper is part of a series of similar works done by one of the co-authors that dealt with Adorno, Schleiermacher and Dilthey, Heidegger, Gadamer and Bultmann, and Lyotard. (shrink)

What determines whether an object is an artwork? In this paper I consider what I will call ‘social’ theories of art, according to which the arthood of objects depends in some way on the art-related social practices that we have. Though such a dependence claim is plausible in principle, social theories of art tend to unpack the determining link between artworks and social practices in terms of intentional relations between the objects in question and the people involved in the relevant (...) practices. This intentionalism has unappealing upshots. Drawing on two-dimensional approaches in social ontology, I show how social theories of art can be done differently, improving their prospects. (shrink)

Tarlac State University (TSU) is a multi-ethnic and multicultural institution with a student population that is predominated by the Kapampangan, Ilocano, and Tagalog ethnolinguistic groups. This paper is a comparative study of the ethnic stereotypes and self-stereotypes of these three ethnolinguistic groups. Using a modified Katz and Braly trait checklist, this paper was able to: 1) profile the ethnic stereotypes and self-stereotypes of these three ethnolinguistic groups, 2) determine their uniformity indices, 3) determine their positivity/negativity indices, 4) compare and contrast (...) their profiled ethnic stereotypes and self-stereotypes, 5) compare and contrast the uniformity indices of their ethnic stereotypes and self-stereotypes, and 6) compare and contrast the positivity/negativity indices of their ethnic stereotypes and self-stereotypes. This paper was also able to establish that the Kapampangan ethnic stereotype and self-stereotype shared the most number of traits in common, while the Tagalog ethnic stereotype and self-stereotype shared the least number of traits in common. This paper was also able to establish that the uniformity indices of the Kapampangan ethnic stereotype and self-stereotype are closest to each other; while those of the Tagalog ethnic stereotype and self-stereotype are farthest from each other. Finally, this paper was able to establish that the positivity/ negativity indices of the Kapampangan and Tagalog ethnic stereotype and self-stereotype are both closest to each other; while those of the Ilocano ethnic stereotype and self-stereotype are farthest to each other. This paper is significant not only in knowing whether there is a difference between how the three ethnolinguistic groups construct each other’s stereotypes and their respective self-stereotypes, but more so in laying down the preliminary information that would lead towards understanding the dynamics among these same ethnolinguistic groups, and towards building a more cohesive student body in TSU, or citizens of Tarlac City, or inhabitants of Tarlac Province. This paper is also important in providing a model study that can be replicated in other multicultural institutions and locations in the country. (shrink)

The linguistic foundations of science and technology include many terms that have been borrowed from ancient languages. In the case of terms with origins in the Greek language, the modern meaning can often differ significantly from the original one. Here we use the PubMed database to demonstrate the prevalence of words of Greek origin in the language of modern science, and call for scientists to exercise care when coining new terms.

Ang papel na ito ay isang kritikal na ulat tungkol sa pilosopiyang Pilipino sa panahon ng rehimeng Duterte. Sa pamamagitan ng Google Scholar tinukoy nito ang limang nangungunang Pilipinong pilosopo na sumuri sa nasabing rehimen: sina Christopher Ryan Maboloc, Regletto Aldrich Imbong, Tracy Llanera, Carlito Gaspar at Jude Raymun Festin. Kinilala nito ang nasabing limang pilosopo, at hinimay ang kani-kanilang pangkalahatang paninindigan kaugnay sa nasabing rehimen, isyung tinutukan, pilosopong kabalitaktakan, at pilosopong tinutungtungan. Sinuri din ng papel na ito ang ideolohiyang (...) politikal ng limang pilosopo gamit ang modipikadong spectrum nina Hans Slomp at F.P.A. Demeterio. Naglahad ang papel na ito ng lagom tungkol sa kabuuang boses ng pilosopiyang Pilipino sa ilalim ng nasabing rehimen. (shrink)

When looking at a scene, observers feel that they see its entire structure in great detail and can immediately notice any changes in it. However, when brief blank fields are placed between alternating displays of an original and a modified scene, a striking failure of perception is induced: identification of changes becomes extremely difficult, even when changes are large and made repeatedly. Identification is much faster when a verbal cue is provided, showing that poor visibility is not the cause of (...) this difficulty. Identification is also faster for objects mentioned in brief verbal descriptions of the scene. These results support the idea that observers never form a complete, detailed representation of their surroundings. In addition, results also indicate that attention is required to perceive change, and that in the absence of localized motion signals it is guided on the basis of high-level interest. (shrink)

Tarlac State University (TSU) is a multi-ethnic and multicultural institution with a student population that is predominated by the Kapampangan, Ilocano, and Tagalog ethnolinguistic groups. Using a modified Katz and Braly trait checklist, a comparative study was able to: 1) profile the stereotypes of these three ethnolinguistic groups, 2) determine their uniformity indices, 3) determine their positivity/negativity indices, 4) compare and contrast their profiled stereotypes, 5) compare and contrast their uniformity indices, and 6) compare and contrast their positivity/negativity indices. This (...) paper was able to establish that (1) the salient traits of the Kapampangan ethnic stereotype are mayabang, masarap magluto, and galante/magastos; those of the Ilocano ethnic stereotype are kuripot, baduy, and madiskarte; and those of the Tagalog ethnic stereotype are maka-Diyos, maganda/guwapo, (2) the Ilocano and the Tagalog ethnic stereotypes shared the most number of traits, while the Kapampangan and Ilocano ethnic stereotypes shared the least number of traits, (3) the Ilocano ethnic stereotype is the sharpest, while the Tagalog ethnic stereotype is the blurriest, and (4) the Tagalog ethnic stereotype is the most positive, while the Kapampangan ethnic stereotype is the most negative. Understanding the dynamics among these ethnolinguistic groups would hopefully lead towards building a more cohesive student body in TSU, or citizens of Tarlac City, or inhabitants of Tarlac Province. This paper is also important in providing a model study that can be replicated in other multicultural institutions and locations in the country. (shrink)

This paper is founded on the assumption that Philippine Studies has five different discouses: 1) Philippine studies as a neutral discourse; 2) colonial Philippine studies as a discourse that is based on western power and reinforces such power; 3) generic postcolonial Philippine studies as a discourse that critiques western hegemony; 4) Pilipinolohiya as a specific postcolonial discourse that was inaugurated by Prospero Covar; and 5) pantayong pananaw as another specific postcolonial discourse that was inaugurated by Zeus Salazar. Malay Journal, on (...) the other hand, is a scholarly periodical intended for researchers in the field of Philippine studies who use the Filipino language. Currently, it is the most respected journal that is exclusively published in Filipino language, based on the fact that it is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education and listed in a number of international abstracting and indexing organizations. This paper intends to establish which among these five discourses of Philippine studies is the most dominant in as far as the articles of the said journal are concerned. In order to attain such goal, this paper analyzed 50% random sample of the articles that were published from 2011, when the journal had completed its shift towards Philippine studies, up to 2015, the present complete year of publication for the said journal. (shrink)

In 1956, a few writings of Wittgenstein that he didn't publish in his lifetime were revealed to the public. These writings were gathered in the book Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (1956). There, we can see that Wittgenstein had some discontentment with the way philosophers, logicians, and mathematicians were thinking about paradoxes, and he even registered a few polemic reasons to not accept Gödel’s incompleteness theorems.

The first purpose of this series of articles is to introduce case studies on how current AI models can be used in the development of a possible theory of quantum gravity, their limitations, and the role the researcher has in steering the development in the right direction, even highlighting the errors, weaknesses and strengths of the whole process. -/- The second is to introduce the new Presentist Fragmentalist ontology as a framework and use it for developing theories of quantum gravity (...) and speculate on achieving a TOE. We emphasize it is necessary for the researcher to check everything in these articles for themselves. While there are many good ideas in this series of papers, the AI is known to make even arithmetic and algebraic mistakes. -/- To select just five apparently good ideas, there is a causal interaction tensor Cαβγδ(F1, F2) that encodes the causal relationship and the strength of the (possibly non-local) interaction between two fragments of reality (formed by each quantum system). There is a quantitative prediction for a testable table-top experiment. There is an explanation of how spacetime emerges from the fragments and their interactions. There is an explicit account of the double-slit experiment. And there is an explanation how this theory accommodates dark matter and dark energy simultaneously. -/- We explore ideas, equations they lead to, concrete calculations, and give corrections along the way. While these are generally morally right within this framework they must be checked by the researcher. Given this caveat, we believe we have made significant progress with the PF interpretation in developing a theory of quantum gravity and pointing out a possible path to a TOE. (shrink)

This is the first in a series of papers developing a theory of quantum gravity that is consistent with the PF interpretation of quantum mechanics. "Key Features: Reconciles quantum theory, general relativity, and the PF interpretation in a common framework...".

When brief blank fields are placed between alternating displays of an original and a modified scene, a striking failure of perception is induced: the changes become extremely difficult to notice, even when they are large, presented repeatedly, and the observer expects them to occur (Rensink, O'Regan, & Clark, 1997). To determine the mechanisms behind this induced "change blindness", four experiments examine its dependence on initial preview and on the nature of the interruptions used. Results support the proposal that representations (...) at the early stages of visual processing are highly volatile, and that focused attention is needed to stabilize them sufficiently to support the perception of change. (shrink)

As a contribution to a wider discussion on moral discernment in theological anthropology, this paper seeks to answer the question “What is the impact of mental illness on an individual’s ability to make moral decisions?” Written from a clinical psychiatric perspective, it considers recent contributions from psychology, neuropsychology and imaging technology. It notes that the popular conception that mental illness necessarily robs an individual of moral responsibility is largely unfounded. Most people who suffer from mental health problems do not lose (...) the capacity to make moral decisions, and mental illness on its own rarely explains anti-social or criminal behaviour. Moreover, the assumptions of some scientists, that recent developments in neuropsychology and brain imaging suggest biological determinism, must be treated with caution. (shrink)

In “Beat the (Backward) Clock,” we argued that John Williams and Neil Sinhababu’s Backward Clock Case fails to be a counterexample to Robert Nozick’s or Fred Dretske’s Theories of Knowledge. Williams’ reply to our paper, “There’s Nothing to Beat a Backward Clock: A Rejoinder to Adams, Barker and Clarke,” is a further attempt to defend their counterexample against a range of objections. In this paper, we argue that, despite the number and length of footnotes, Williams is still wrong.

This paper continues developing the theory of everything consistent with the Presentist Fragmentalist interpretation of quantum mechanics.

This is a transcript of a conversation between P F Strawson and Gareth Evans in 1973, filmed for The Open University. Under the title 'Truth', Strawson and Evans discuss the question as to whether the distinction between genuinely fact-stating uses of language and other uses can be grounded on a theory of truth, especially a 'thin' notion of truth in the tradition of F P Ramsey.

Joint actions often require agents to track others’ actions while planning and executing physically incongruent actions of their own. Previous research has indicated that this can lead to visuomotor interference effects when it occurs outside of joint action. How is this avoided or overcome in joint actions? We hypothesized that when joint action partners represent their actions as interrelated components of a plan to bring about a joint action goal, each partner’s movements need not be represented in relation to distinct, (...) incongruent proximal goals. Instead they can be represented in relation to a single proximal goal – especially if the movements are, or appear to be, mechanically linked to a more distal joint action goal. To test this, we implemented a paradigm in which participants produced finger movements that were either congruent or incongruent with those of a virtual partner, and either with or without a joint action goal (the joint flipping of a switch, which turned on two light bulbs). Our findings provide partial support for the hypothesis that visuomotor interference effects can be reduced when two physically incongruent actions are represented as mechanically interdependent contributions to a joint action goal. (shrink)

"This self-consistent evolution of the fragments, their causal relationships, and their quantum properties is at the heart of the FCQG-SM framework, providing a unified description of quantum mechanics, general relativity, and the Standard Model.".

Many philosophical theories of causation are egalitarian, rejecting a distinction between causes and mere causal conditions. We sought to determine the extent to which people's causal judgments discriminate, selecting as causes counternormal events—those that violate norms of some kind—while rejecting non-violators. We found significant selectivity of this sort. Moreover, priming that encouraged more egalitarian judgments had little effect on subjects. We also found that omissions are as likely as actions to be judged as causes, and that counternormative selectivity appears to (...) apply equally to actions and omissions. (shrink)

Is the societal-level of analysis sufficient today to understand the values of those in the global workforce? Or are individual-level analyses more appropriate for assessing the influence of values on ethical behaviors across country workforces? Using multi-level analyses for a 48-society sample, we test the utility of both the societal-level and individual-level dimensions of collectivism and individualism values for predicting ethical behaviors of business professionals. Our values-based behavioral analysis indicates that values at the individual-level make a more significant contribution to (...) explaining variance in ethical behaviors than do values at the societal-level. Implicitly, our findings question the soundness of using societal-level values measures. Implications for international business research are discussed. (shrink)

Leopold Kronecker (1823–1891) was a German mathematician who worked on number theory and algebra. He is considered a pre-intuitionist, being only close to intuitionism because he rejected Cantor’s Set Theory. He was, in fact, more radical than the intuitionists. Unlike Poincaré, for example, Kronecker didn’t accept the transfinite numbers as valid mathematical entities.

In this paper we focus our attention on tableau methods for propositional interval temporal logics. These logics provide a natural framework for representing and reasoning about temporal properties in several areas of computer science. However, while various tableau methods have been developed for linear and branching time point-based temporal logics, not much work has been done on tableau methods for interval-based ones. We develop a general tableau method for Venema's \cdt\ logic interpreted over partial orders (\nsbcdt\ for short). It combines (...) features of the classical tableau method for first-order logic with those of explicit tableau methods for modal logics with constraint label management, and it can be easily tailored to most propositional interval temporal logics proposed in the literature. We prove its soundness and completeness, and we show how it has been implemented. (shrink)

Frege discussed Mill’s empiricist ideas and Kant’s rationalist ideas about the nature of mathematics, and employed Set Theory and logico-philosophical notions to develop a new concept for the natural numbers. All this is objectively exposed by this paper.

It is undeniable Poincaré was a very famous and influential scientist. So, possibly because of it, it was relatively easy for him to participate in the heated discussions of the foundations of mathematics in the early 20th century. We can say it was “easy” because he didn't get involved in this subject by writing great treatises, or entire books about his own philosophy of mathematics (as other authors from the same period did). Poincaré contributed to the philosophy of mathematics by (...) writing short essays and letters. (shrink)

Husserl came over to philosophy from mathematics and he devoted many years to the formulation of a firm foundation for Philosophy that could even secure the status of "science" for it. But unlike some of his contemporaries (like Frege and Russell), he did not seek salvation for philosophy in the mathematical method. He argued philosophy (like any other field of study) should pay attention to uninterpreted basic experience and this would lead the way to understanding the essence of things. Essence, (...) then, would become conscious and this process was addressed by him as “phenomenological reduction.”. (shrink)

Let’s suppose all the rules of physics will change, but, before the change, we finally figured out everything there was to be figured out about physics. This means that we achieved pragmatic completeness at that point. It’s not a universal Platonic completeness, but everything there was to be expressed about the physics at that moment was expressed.

Kant and Descartes followed an extreme clever, secure way of reasoning. For them, there must be a world of differences, or of movement, before we can extract anything (ideas, laws, concepts, etc.) from the world. For Kant, these “changes” that secure the possibility of knowledge were the ones we can measure with the categories of space and time. While, for Descartes, since there exist two things: “me” and “the world”, we can say knowledge is possible. But I think we can (...) extract a more abstract, general principle from the similarities between both Descartes and Kant’s mobilist tendency. (shrink)

Jerry Fodor deemed informational encapsulation ‘the essence’ of a system’s modularity and argued that human perceptual processing comprises modular systems, thus construed. Nowadays, his conclusion is widely challenged. Often, this is because experimental work is seen to somehow demonstrate the cognitive penetrability of perceptual processing, where this is assumed to conflict with the informational encapsulation of perceptual systems. Here, I deny the conflict, proposing that cognitive penetration need not have any straightforward bearing on the conjecture that perceptual processing is composed (...) of nothing but informationally encapsulated modules, the conjecture that each and every perceptual computation is performed by an informationally encapsulated module, and the consequences perceptual encapsulation was traditionally expected to have for a perception-cognition border, the epistemology of perception and cognitive science. With these points in view, I propose that particularly plausible cases of cognitive penetration would actually seem to evince the encapsulation of perceptual systems rather than refute/problematize this conjecture. (shrink)

The problem of plant individuality is something which has vexed botanists throughout the ages, with fashion swinging back and forth from treating plants as communities of individuals (Darwin 1800 ; Braun and Stone 1853 ; Münch 1938 ) to treating them as organisms in their own right, and although the latter view has dominated mainstream thought most recently (Harper 1977 ; Cook 1985 ; Ariew and Lewontin 2004 ), a lively debate conducted mostly in Scandinavian journals proves that the issues (...) are far from being resolved (Tuomi and Vuorisalo 1989b ; Fagerström 1992 ; Pan and Price 2001 ). In this paper I settle the matter once and for all, by showing which elements of each side are correct. (shrink)

Is the societal-level of analysis sufficient today to understand the values of those in the global workforce? Or are individual-level analyses more appropriate for assessing the influence of values on ethical behaviors across country workforces? Using multi-level analyses for a 48-society sample, we test the utility of both the societal-level and individual-level dimensions of collectivism and individualism values for predicting ethical behaviors of business professionals. Our values-based behavioral analysis indicates that values at the individual-level make a more significant contribution to (...) explaining variance in ethical behaviors than do values at the societal-level. Implicitly, our findings question the soundness of using societal-level values measures. Implications for international business research are discussed. (shrink)

This paper objectively defines the three main contemporary philosophies of mathematics: formalism, logicism, and intuitionism. Being the three leading scientists of each: Hilbert (formalist), Frege (logicist), and Poincaré (intuitionist).

This paper continues and extensive exploration of the QG and TOE resulting from the PF interpretation of QM. Some highlights are an exploration of symmetries of the Standard Model, outlines of testable predictions of implications for QG, that this theory can simultaneously give an account of dark matter and dark energy, probabilities and statevector collapse vs. gravity, applications of the causal interaction tensor Cαβγδ(Fi, Fj). Note the first section mentions qualia but this is not a psychological theory this is an (...) ontic theory. (shrink)

This paper refines a controversial proposal: that core systems belong to a perceptual kind, marked out by the format of its representational outputs. Following Susan Carey, this proposal has been understood in terms of core representations having an iconic format, like certain paradigmatically perceptual outputs. I argue that they don’t, but suggest that the proposal may be better formulated in terms of a broader analogue format type. Formulated in this way, the proposal accommodates the existence of genuine icons in perception, (...) and avoids otherwise troubling objections. (shrink)

It has been claimed that naïve realism predicts phenomenological similarities where there are none and, thereby, mischaracterises the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. If true, this undercuts a key motivation for the view. Here, we defend naïve realism against this charge, proposing that such arguments fail (three times over). In so doing, we highlight a more general problem with critiques of naïve realism that target the purported phenomenological predictions of the view. The problem is: naïve realism, broadly construed, doesn’t make (...) phenomenological predictions of the required sort. So, as a result, opponents must resign themselves to attacking specific incarnations of naïve realism, or approach matters quite differently. (shrink)

General Introduction: In [1] a Calculus of Qualia (CQ) was proposed. The key idea is that, for example, blackness is radically different than █. The former term, “blackness” refers to or is about a quale, whereas the latter term, “█” instantiates a quale in the reader’s mind and is non-referential; it does not even refer to itself. The meaning and behavior of these terms is radically different. All of philosophy, from Plato through Descartes through Chalmers, including hieroglyphics and emojis, used (...) referential terms up until CQ. This paper in this series of papers includes a relatively short but comprehensive discussion with the AI Claude 3.5 Sonnet on how the CQ impacts various theories of consciousness, including Materialism, Dualism, Idealism, and 14 others. (shrink)

This paper give the first foray into the development of a Theory of Everything that is consistent with the PF interpretation of quantum mechanics.

General Introduction: In [1] a Calculus of Qualia (CQ) was proposed. The key idea is that, for example, blackness is radically different than █. The former term, “blackness” refers to or is about a quale, whereas the latter term, “█” instantiates a quale in the reader’s mind and is non-referential; it does not even refer to itself. The meaning and behavior of these terms is radically different. All of philosophy, from Plato through Descartes through Chalmers, including hieroglyphics and emojis, used (...) referential terms up until CQ. This paper in this series of papers addresses the question of why is there something rather than nothing, at length, and gives a radical new answer. It has to do with the fact in CQ that, while blackness is contingently possible, █ is necessarily actual, as it was in this sentence. (shrink)